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BOSTON COLLEGE 
LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME XXXI DECEMBER 1989 NUMBER 1 
REFLECTIONS O N  THE SUPREME COURT'S 
1988 TERM: THE EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION DECISIONS AND THE 
ABANDONMENT OF THE SECOND 
RECONSTRUCTIONT* 
July 2, 1989, was the 25th anniversary of the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' passed in the wake of the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy. Congress designed Title V112 of that 
landmark legislation to eliminate discrimination from the American 
~ o r k p l a c e , ~  and it placed the considerable power of federal law and 
the federal courts behind the demand for equal employment op- 
portunity in the private as well as public ~ e c t o r . ~  
Guiding this law through the 88th Congress was no mean po- 
litical feat. The New York Times recently published a photograph of 
t Copyright O 1990 Mark S. Brodin. 
* This article is based on a presentation the author made to a Federal Judicial Center 
Seminar for United States Magistrates held in Boston, Massachusetts in July, 1989. 
** Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1972, Columbia 
University. 
' 42 U.S.C. $9 2000a-2000h(6) (1982). 
42 U.S.C. $0 2000e-e-17 (1982). 
.. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 26 (1963). See generally Vaas, Title 1/11: 
Le.gxlatiue History, 7 B.C. I N D .  & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966). 
The law was amended in 1972 to cover governmental as well as private employers. See 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 9: 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
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the ceremony in which President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil 
Rights Act.5 Seated in the first row in the photograph are Senators 
Everett Dirkson and Hubert Humphrey, together with Congress- 
men Charles Halleck and Emanuel Celler. How was agreement 
possible among persons of such conflicting political philosophies on 
a matter as controversial as Title VII? 
Part of the explanation may be found in the vague nature of 
the statute's language. It prohibits "discrimination" in employment 
opportunities "because of" an individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origim6 The legislation does not provide a definition of 
"discrimination." It does not specify how discrimination is to be 
proven or disproven in court. It does not disclose what "because 
of" actually means in practice - whether the impermissible reason 
must be the sole reason for the challenged employment decision, or 
merely one of the reasons behind it. The statute fails to address the 
question of the extent of a court's power to remedy discrimination 
by ordering racial (or other) preferences, or whether an employer 
can establish such preferences voluntarily without running afoul of 
the law. Rather, these fundamental questions, and numerous others, 
were left to the courts to answer. Title VII may thus aptly be 
described as "judicial legislation." Legislators with diametrically dif- 
ferent views on these questions could still join together in 1964 in 
support of the proposed law. 
Over the past 25 years, the federal courts have been busy 
defining the scope and content of Title VII. They have developed 
the two basic theories of discrimination that we now call disparate 
treatment and disparate i m p a ~ t . ~  They have devised the schemes of 
proof in which inferences of discrimination may be raised by certain 
sequences of e ~ e n t s , ~  and by  statistic^.^ The courts have drawn the 
N.Y. Times, Jul. 2, 1989, at 16. 
42 U.S.C. B 2000e-2 (1982). The operative text provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(I) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em- 
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em- 
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religions, sex, or national origin. 
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 11.15 (1977). 
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792 (1973). 
See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. 
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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contours of appropriate relief, including affirmative or group rem- 
edies (both court-ordered and voluntary) that are designed not to 
. 
compensate actual victims but rather to dismantle patterns of dis- 
criminatory practices. l o  
Over those 25 years, the Justices on the Supreme Court had 
reached a reasonably reliable consensus as to the direction in which 
Title VII should proceed. That consensus broke down last Term, 
and we have witnessed a fundamental change in the Court's inter- 
pretation of Title VII (as well as other civil rights legislation) and 
its attitude toward the persisting problem of discrimination in our 
society. While the Bush Administration wo~lld have us believe that 
these are only "technical" changes," an exploration of the decisions 
reveals otherwise. 
11. THE DEFINITION OF "DISCRIMINATION" AND THE STANDARDS OF 
PROOF UNDER TITLE VII 
A. Disparate Treatment 
Since the Court's 1971 decision in Grzggs v. Duke Power Co.,12 
authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, "discrimination" within 
the context of Title VII has had two meanings: disparate treatment 
and disparate impact. Disparate treatment is the familiar form of 
intentional, deliberate conduct motivated by bias against the em- 
ployee, such as the refusal to promote a woman because she is a 
woman. Proof of discriminatory motive is essential to the plaintiff's 
case. A plaintiff may prove motive by either direct evidence, such 
as an admission by a manager that females are not considered for 
promotion in the firm, or indirect circumstantial proof, such as 
demonstrating that the female plaintiff has the qualifications for 
advancement possessed by others who have been promoted, that 
she nevertheless was rejected, and that a man was promoted in her 
place.13 This prima facie showing raises an inference, or suspicion, 
that gender motivated the adverse decision. The cmployer must 
then articulate the non-discriminatory reasons it claims justified the 
. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); 
United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n 
v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
' 1  Boston Globe, Sept. 11, 1989, at 14, col. 2; Boston Globe, Aug. 23, 1989, at 3, col. 1. 
l 2  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
l 3  See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 430 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792 (1973). 
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decision. Those reasons are subject to further scrutiny because the 
plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that they are pretextual 
- mere excuses to cover bias. 
Disparate treatment claims can also be pursued in the aggre- 
gate, as a class action alleging deliberate systemic practices of dis- 
crin~ination. Here the plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case by 
reliance upon statistical imbalances between the number of minority 
or female workers one would expect to be employed, given the 
make-up of the labor market from which applicants are drawn, and 
the number that are actually employed.14 Such imbalances raise an 
inference of discriminatory motivation, requiring the employer to 
come forward with another explanation. 
Disparate treatment emerged from last Term relatively un- 
changed. Price Waterhous~ v. Hopkir~s'~ resolved the question of the 
appropriate standard of causation to be applied in a Title VII case. 
Ms. IIopkins was a candidate for partnership in the defendant 
accounting firm, but was put on hold indefinitely and eventually 
rejected. She brought a Title VII action alleging that the rejection 
was based on her gender. Evidence in her favor included the almost 
complete exclusion of women from the 662 partnership slots at 
Price Waterhouse, and her own tremendous personal success at the 
firm, including landing a $25 million contract. In addition, she 
pointed to comments made by several partners in their evaluations 
of her which United States District Judge Gesell found were clearly 
rriotivated by bias against females. For example, she was criticized 
for being too aggressive, and she was advised to "walk more femi- 
ninely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."'" 
Judge Gesell found, however, thet Price Waterhouse did have 
additional, non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting Hopkins: pri- 
marily, her lack of interpersonal skills. The  problem became, there- 
fore, the familiar one in individual treatment cases: sorting out the 
legitimate from the discriminatory reasons. How important a role 
must discrimination play in the decision before a court can say that 
the decision was "because of" sex? This question had, in the words 
of the Court, "left the Circuits in disarray."17 
I' See International Bhd. of Tcamstcrs v. Urlitcd Statcs, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazclwood 
Scllool Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
l"09 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 
'"18F.Supp. 1109, 1117(D.D.C. 1985). 
l 7  Price Waterlzouse, 109 S. C:t. at 1784 n.2. See generally Rrodin, The Standard of' Causation 
in  the hfzxed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Persfiective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982). 
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Under the formulation that the Court adopted in Hopkins, 
plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that gender (or other 
impermissible criteria) played a motivating part in the challenged 
decision. The defendant employer can nevertheless avoid liability 
by proving (by a preponderance of the evidence) that it would have 
. 
made the same decision even if there had been no gender bias. In 
effect, then, this "harmless error" standard will require litigants to 
reconstruct the decisionmaking process in court and extrapolate the 
likely result as if the factor of discrimination had not been present.ls 
3. Disparate Impact 
Disparate impact discrimination is a "no-fault" theory of Title 
VII liability that was developed by a unanimous Court in Griggs and 
refined in the years since 197 1. The decisions of the past two Terms 
have changed the theory dramatically. 
The premise behind impact theory is that if an ostensibly neu- 
tral employment practice (such as an "objective" written examina- 
tion) has an exclusionary effect that operates as the functional equiv- 
alent of intentional discrimination, then that practice must be 
scrutinized to determine whether it serves an essential purpose of 
the employer's operation.lg If the practice does not serve such a 
purpose then, given its exclusionary effect, it cannot be justified 
and is deemed violative of Title VII. In such a case, it is irrelevant 
that deliberate intent to discriminate is lacking or cannot be proven. 
Title VII, as the Griggs Court read it, is directed as much against 
discriminatory effects as it is against discriminatory motivation: 
"good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to mea- 
suring job capability."2O 
Thus, when the Duke Power Company in Griggs utilized "ob- 
jective" selection devices like the possession of a high school diploma 
l8 Other than the causation question, two additional points should be noted about 
Hopkins. First, it confirms prior precedent extending the coverage of Title VII beyond the 
. 
traditional employer-employee relationship. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 
(1984) (partnership in a law firm). Second, it establishes that sex-stereotyping is a form of 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. An employer cannot make personnil decisions based 
on stereotypical notions of the proper conduct and role of females or  males. 
* 
'"ee Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. C H I .  L. REV. 235 (1971). 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. Title VII requires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate 
on the basis of racial o r  other impermissible classification." Id. at 431. 
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or the achievement of a passing grade on an intelligence test, and 
those devices resulted in the disproportionate rejection of minority 
 applicant^,^^ the burden shifted to the employer to show that the s 
devices "bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance 
of the jobs for which [they were] used."22 It was not enough to 
convince the courts, as the company did, that it had no intent or . 
design to exclude minorities. Rather, the "touchstone is business 
nece~sity."~~ Because Duke Power could not produce evidence of a 
substantial relationship between these devices and success on the 
job, the company was in effect arbitrarily excluding minority can- 
didates and thus in violation of Title VII. 
In the years following Griggs, the federal judiciary was actively 
involved in reviewing an enormous range of "objective" selection 
devices that stood as obstacles to the employment of minorities and 
women, including height-weight minimums for law enforcement 
positions,24 written  examination^,^^ experience requirement~,2~ no- 
spouse hiring rules,27 and exclusion of applicants with any record 
of arrest.28 In the process, it became apparent that many employers 
had systematically over-screened their applicants, insisting on re- 
quirements that might look good on paper but had little if anything 
to do with the ability to perform the jobs in question.29 Under Griggs, 
there was no need to delve into the motives of the employers, and 
such requirements fell.30 
21 'rhis was demonstrated not by actual applicant flow figures, but by resort to census 
figures showing that whites in North Carolina were approximately three times more likely 
to have completed high school than blacks. See id. at 430 n.6. Such potential disparate impact 
also served as the basis for the decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(disproportionate impact of height-weight minimum for correction officer demonstrated on 
the basis of national census figures). But see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 
568 (1979) (suggesting the necessity in certain circumstances for presentation of actual 
applicant flow data to demonstrate adverse impact). 
22 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
23 Id. 
24 Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
25 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
26 Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972). 
27 EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 307 
(1986); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 197'7), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
934 (1978). 
28 Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
2g See generally Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportuntty, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 318 (1978). Under the standards of proof that developed in impact cases, even if an 
employer could prove that a challenged practice actually did predict job performance, the 
plaintiff could still prevail by demonstrating that less discriminatory alternatives achieved the 
same goals. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425. 
3 0 - ~ s  the Court has noted, Congress "recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact 
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Title VII remained at this stage until the decision in Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank €3 Trust,31 issued at the end of the 1987 Term. Prior 
to that decision, the dividing line had been relatively sharp between 
cases alleging deliberate bias and those challenging specific neutral 
practices under Griggsa3* Watson significantly blurred that line, and 
v 
the Court's decision this Term in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
A t ~ n i o ~ ~  may have obliterated it. 
Clara Watson, a black woman, was denied four promotions by 
the Fort Worth Bank, all in a process of subjective evaluation by 
her supervisors and in the absence of any formal or precise require- 
ments for promotion. She filed a Title VII action proceeding on 
both disparate impact and disparate treatment grounds. Both the 
district and circuit courts rejected her impact claim, holding that 
discretionary and subjective personnel systems could not be ana- 
lyzed under impact theory.34 Because this represented a split in the 
circuits, the Court granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court reversed and held, with each participating 
Justice ill agreement, that impact theory applies equally to subjective 
as well as objective personnel practices.35 In the opinion of the 
Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that limitation of impact theory 
to objective practices would create an incentive for employers to 
abandon those merit-based practices in favor of more easily defen- 
sible subjective decisionmaking, which could only be challenged 
successfully upon a showing of deliberate intent to d i~cr iminate .~~ 
analysis employed by the Court in Griggs." Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982). 
See also Thomson, The  Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent i n  1972 - A Response to 
Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105, 116 (1986) ("Congress ratified Griggs and the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination"). 
When Congress has disagreed with the Court's interpretation of Title VII, it has taken 
action to change it, as illustrated by its 1978 amendments of the definition section to include 
pregnancy as a prohibited ground for selection, thus overruling General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125 (1976). Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (adding a new 
5 701(k)). See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 
(1983) (Congress "unambiguously expressed its disapproval" of the Gilbert decision). 
31 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). 
32 That line had begun to blur in certain decisions. See A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIS- 
CRIMINATION 5 76.32 (1989), discussing several circuit courts' extension of impact theory to 
1 
subjective selection systems. Compare Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C.Cir. 1984) with 
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982). 
3s 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). 
34 There were some circuit court decisions to the contrary. See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2783. 
8 
35 Id ,  at 2787, 2791. In both contexts, the Court emphasized, it is the plaintiff's burden 
to isolate and identify the devices allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities, 
and to establish a causal relationship between the device and the disparity. Id ,  at 2788. 
36 See id. at 2786. 
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In stretching impact theory to cover both objective and discre- 
tionary practices, however, the Watson Court also significantly 
changed the nature of impact litigation. It did so by loosening the 
previously tight standard of job relation set down in Griggs and its 
progeny. A plurality of four Justices3' indicated that employers 
would no longer be required to produce in court formal validation 
studies to demonstrate empirically that the challenged device pre- 
dicted job p e r f ~ r m a n c e . ~ ~  Nor would the employer bear the burden 
of proof on the question of "manifest relationship" between selec- 
tion device and job. Rather, the plaintiff would have the burden of 
demonstrating the lack of business necessity, or the availability of 
devices that achieve the same purpose for the employer but without 
the discriminatory effect.39 
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc, v. Atonio40 expanded impact theory 
yet again to include multi-component selection systems with both 
discretionary and objective features. As its dimensions grew bigger, 
however, impact theory was also losing its unique no-fault character. 
The litigation in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. involved a chal- 
lenge to the hiring practices ill the Alaskan salmon industry. The 
defendant companies operated canneries in which jobs were divided 
into skilled and unskilled, the former paying more and providing 
better working conditions than the latter. The skilled jobs were filled 
mostly by whites and the unskilled mostly by minorities, and the 
employees were separated in different living quarters and dining 
areas. Plaintiffs alleged that the racial stratification resulted from 
defendants' selection practices, which included subjective and ob- 
jective criteria,41 and they sought to pursue both disparate treatment 
and disparate impact claims. 
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful on both counts in the district court. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
and remanded, holding that the plaintiffs had made out a prima 
facie case of disparate impact on the basis of the internal workforce 
statistics showing a disparity between the high percentage of whites 
in the skilled jobs and the high percentage of minorities in the 
unskilled jobs.42 The Ninth Circuit further held that this shifted the 
37 O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Scalia were the four. 
3* 108 S. Ct. at 2790. 
sg Id. at 2790-91. 
40 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). 
41 These included nepotism, a rehire preference, and an English language requirement. 
Id. at 2120. 
42 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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burden to the employer on remand to prove that business necessity 
justified the devices. 
The Supreme Court reversed. While agreeing that impact the- 
ory was applicable to the defendants' complex selection system, the 
Court disagreed that a prima facie case had been made out. More- 
# 
over, a majority of the Justices4how held that the burden of per- 
suasion on the question of business justification lies with the plain- 
tiff, not the employer.44 
Since Gmggs, plaintiffs have generally demonstrated discrimi- 
natory impact by showing that the challenged practice had either 
an actual or at least a potential exclusionary effect. Thus, in Grzgg~s 
itself, the plaintiff's proof focused on the high school diploma 
requirement's effect on the potential pool of applicants: available 
statewide data indicated that white applicants would be three times 
more likely to possess the diploma than black applicants. In other 
cases, plaintiffs have used the actual applicant pool to demonstrate 
the disproportionate impact of a particular device.45 
Thus, it is not surprising that the Ward., Cove Court rejected 
the internal workforce comparison used by the Ninth Cir~ui t .~"  The 
Court held that the proper comparison must be between the racial 
composition of the qualified labor market from which workers are 
hired and the persons holding the jobs.47 But proof of such a 
disparity, the Court emphasized, is only the first crucial step in the 
proof of an impact case. Plaintiffs must further demonstrate "spe- 
cific causation," i .e., that "the disparity they complain of is the result 
of one or more of the employment practices that they are attacking 
here, specifically showing that each challenged practice has a sig- 
nificantly disparate impact on the employment opportunities for 
Justice Kennedy joined the previous plurality from bvatton. 
' I  109 S. Ct. at 2125-27. 
'j See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 410 (1982)  he irripact of a civil service examination). 
4t) Such an approach, the Court wrote, "would mean that any employer who had a 
segrrient of his work force that was - for sorric reason - racially imbalanced, could be haled 
into court and forced to engage in the expensive and lirrie-consurriing task of defending the 
'business necessity' of the rricthods used to sclcct the other rncrnbcrs or  his workforce." 109 
a 
S. (:t. at 2122. 
" Id. at 21 21. Thus,  for cxanlplc, iP Ihc population or  persons qualified to be skilled 
workers [or Wards Cove Packing Co. was 25% minority, and its skilled workrorcc was 2% 
a 
minority, the Suprerrie Court presunlably would l i r~d the beginnings of an  impact case. 
This is tlze .same comparison that is the focus of the syslenlic disparate t7-mtmmt case, 
where the slalislical irribalance serves an evidentiary purpose of permitting an inference of 
discrirriinatory rriotivation. See IIazclwood School Dist. v. Unitcd Stales, 433 U.S. 299 ( 1  977); 
International Ahd. of 'l'carristcrs v. Unitcd States, 431 U.S. 321 (1977). 
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whites and non-whites."48 The cumulative effect of several practices 
cannot be used to establish the necessary causal c~nnection.~" 
In the context of a multi-component selection process, proving 
specific causation is likely to be difficult at best. But the greater 
importance of Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. lies in its treatment of 
the business justification defense. Adopting a scheme modeled on 
the defense of an individual disparate treatment case,50 the Court, 
now by a five Justice majority, held that the employer simply must 
produce evidence (not necessarily empirical) of business purpose, 
but that the burden remains on the disparate impact plaintiff to 
prove the absence of business necessity.51 This was a clear break from 
past precedent, including the Court's own line of decisions from 
Griggs to Wat~on.~2 Moreover, in the Wards Cove scheme, "there is 
no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indis- 
pensible7 to the employer's business for it to pass muster."53 
Business necessity, in short, is no longer the affirmative defense 
it was conceived of in Griggs, but rather has become a negative 
element of the plaintiff's case. Given the typical imbalance in re- 
sources between the litigants in discrimination cases, that burden 
on the plaintiff is likely to be insurmountable in many instances. 
Justice White, in his opinion for the Court in Wards Cove Packing 
Co., Inc. added a telling comment regarding the scheme of proof. 
He indicated that a plaintiff who could not prove the lack of busi- 
ness necessity could nevertheless still prevail by proving the exis- 
tence of a less discriminatory alternative - another practice that 
would achieve the same purposes for the employer but without the 
disparate racial or gender impact. The availability of such an alter- 
native, particularly where employers refused to adopt it, "would 
belie a claim by [the employers] that their incumbent practices are 
being employed for non-discriminatory reasons," and demonstrate 
that the practices were mere pretexts for di~crimination.~~ This 
statement reveals that a majority of the Court now apparently views 
' V a r d s  Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2125. 
4y Id. at 2124. 
50 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
" Wards  Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2125-27. 
5 2  See id. at 2128-32, and cases collected at 2130 n.14. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Decisions 
of this Court and other federal courts repeatedly have recognized that while the employer's 
burden in a disparatc treatment case is simply one of coming forward with evidence of 
legitimate business purpose, its burden in a disparate impact case is proof of an affirmative 
defense of business necessity." Id. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5 V d .  at 2126. 
" Id.  at 2126-27. 
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impact theory through fault-colored eyegla~ses .~~ The Justices have, 
in short, shifted the focus of impact cases to the covert intentions 
* and motives of the employer, the same focus as treatment cases, 
and thus carrying the same substantial difficulties of proof.56 
Before Watson and Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., impact theory 
6 
was characterized by its singular focus on objective practices, its 
formidable standard of proof for the employer's demonstration of 
job relation or business necessity, and its explicit rejection of any 
focus on the intent or motivation of the employer in utilizing the 
practice. These recent decisions materially alter each attribute and, 
in so doing, place in serious doubt the future of impact theory as 
an effective weapon against nonmerit-based exclusion of minorities 
and women. Justice Blackmun was prompted to wonder "whether 
the majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more ac- 
curately, race discrimination against non-whites - is a problem in 
our society, or even remembers that it ever 
Prospective Title VII plaintiffs and their counsel will find fur- 
ther discouragement in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. 
Z i p e ~ , ~ ~  a case concerning the award of attorneys fees to successful 
plaintiffs. Section 706(k) of Title VII authorizes the award of attor- 
neys fees to "prevailing parties."59 The Court has previously held 
that fees could be awarded to a prevailing defendant from a losing 
plaintiff only if the latter's case is found to be frivolous, unreason- 
able, or without foundation. In contrast, fee awards to prevailing 
plaintiffs against losing defendants are to be virtually auto ma ti^.^^ 
The distinction in standards reflects the Court's recognition that 
plaintiffs are acting as private attorney generals when pursuing 
Title VII cases, and should not be discouraged from doing so by a 
reading of section 706(k) that leaves them open to an award of fees 
55 The Court speaks of the possibility that there were few qualified nonwhite applicants 
"for reasons that are not petitioners' fault," and thus that cannot constitute disparate impact. 
Id.  at 2122. 
g 56 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit presaged this shift in a 
1983 opinion, referring to impact theory "as a form of pretext analysis to handle specific 
employment practices not obviously job-related." Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 
F.2d 686, 707 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). 
57 Wards  Cove Packing Co., Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
5a 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). 
60 See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). 
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merely because they do not prevail. In contrast, a defendant who 
does not prevail has by definition been adjudged a violater of fed- 
eral law. 
Zifies confronted the Court with the question of a fee award 
against a losing intervenor. An action had been brought by female 
flight cabin attendants challenging TWA's policy of terminating 
attendants who became mothers. TWA abandoned the policy, and 
the focus of the litigation turned to the question of remedy for past 
victims of the policy. The parties agreed to a tentative settlement 
that would credit these persons with competitive seniority. At that 
point the union representing the flight attendants intervened to 
challenge modification of the seniority system. The challenge was 
ultimately rejected after considerable litigation, and plaintiffs sub- 
sequently sought an award of attorneys fees against the union. The 
district court held that fee awards against intervenors should be 
made under the same standard as awards against defendants (i.e., 
be virtually automatic) and the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys 
fees in the amount of $181,000.61 
The Court reversed and remanded. While ruling that district 
courts have the authority to award fees against unsuccessful inter- 
venors, the Court held that in cases where the intervenor was not 
charged or adjudged liable for its own Title VII violation, such fees 
may be awarded only if the intervenor's action was frivolous, un- 
reasonable, or  without f o ~ n d a t i o n . ~ ~  The standard to be applied, in 
other words, is the nearly insurmountable standard for the award 
of fees against losing plaintiffs. 
As a result of Ziipes, plaintiffs in Title VII litigation will generally 
have to bear the cost of litigating third-party claims and defenses 
(presumably regarding liability as well as remedy). The likely con- 
sequence of the decision, Justice Marshall observed in his dissent, 
will be that 
defendants can rely on intervenors to raise many of their 
defenses, thereby minimizing the fee exposure of defen- 
dants and forcing prevailing plaintiffs to litigate many, if 
not most, of their claims against parties from whom they 
have no chance of recovering fees. Without the hope of 
obtaining compensation for the expenditures caused by 
intervenors, many victims of discrimination will be forced 
Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 
861, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
62 Zipes, 109 S. Ct. at 2739. 
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to forgo remedial litigation for lack of financial resources. 
As a result, injuries will go unredressed and the national 
policy against discrimination will go ~ n r e d e e m e d . ~ ~  
IV. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION QUESTION 
Since the mid-1970s the "affirmative action" issue has domi- 
nated the political discourse regarding fair employment law. Is it 
permissible, in the interest of remedying the effects of past discrim- 
ination, to employ race-conscious preferences that in themselves 
constitute a form of "reverse discrimination?" Stated differently, the 
issue is the extent to which a court may order - or litigants may 
consent to, or employers may voluntarily adopt - group relief that 
goes beyond compensating actual victims of discrimination. The 
emotion of the issue is created in large part by the fact that we are 
talking about a zero-sum game: if minorities or females are to be 
given a preference, whites and males will generally be disadvan- 
taged. 
Since Regents of the University of California v. B ~ k k e , ~ ~  the Su- 
preme Court has been struggling with the question of race-con- 
scious relief. As a matter of enforcing Title VII and other civil 
rights statutes, it has long been argued that merely making actual 
victims whole will neither significantly advance employment oppor- 
tunities for minorities and women, nor present a credible deterrent 
against future violations. The granting of race-conscious relief fol- 
lowing a determination of liability under Title VII thus has become 
a familiar part of the legal landscape, and has secured the approval 
of the Supreme AS the Court has observed, the purpose 
of such relief "is not to make identified victims whole, but rather to 
dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to pre- 
vent discrimination in the future."66 
The more difficult question is the extent to which an employer 
or labor union voluntarily may impose race-based remedies on the 
workplace. Beginning with United Steelworkers of America v. we be^,^' 
63 Id. at 2746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
64 438 U.S. 265 (1978). This case dealt with the setting aside for minority applicants of 
a number of positions in the medical school entering class. An earlier case raising the question, 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), was dismissed as moot. 
3 65 See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' 
Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
66 478 U.S. at 474-75. 
67 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
14 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 1 : 1 
a majority of the Supreme Court has supported the concept of 
voluntary affirmative action, within certain limitations. Over the 
dissent of Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, the Weber 
Court rejected a Title VII reverse discrimination case brought by a 
white man challenging a private sector affirmative action program 
(reserving fifty percent of the crafts training positions for black 
employees) negotiated as part of the collective bargaining agree- 
ment. The Court developed a two-part analysis for review of such 
plans.68 First, there had to be sufficient justification for such action, 
which in Weber came in the form of a long-standing underrepresen- 
tation locally and nationally of minorities in the particular industry. 
Second, the plan had to be "narrowly tailored" and not overly- 
broad. Thus, the racial preference would have to be temporary 
(e.g., expire when parity was reached); not completely exclude 
whites from the jobs; not require the discharge of whites to make 
room for blacks; and constitute a flexible goal rather than an un- 
yielding quota. 
Since Weber, the Court has revisited the voluntary affirmative 
action question in the context of public employers, and it has tight- 
ened its scrutiny of such preferences.'j9 In Wygant v. Jackson Board 
of Edu~a t ion ,~~  the Court struck down (under the Equal Protection 
Clause) the preferential layoff protection provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the 
teachers' union. The provision suspended the previous reverse se- 
niority layoff practice. A plurality of the Justices rejected the notion 
that societal discrimination alone could justify such race-conscious 
decisionmaking by a public employer. Rather, in his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Powell emphasized the need for "particularized find- 
ings" of discrimination - the employer "must have sufficient evi- 
dence to justify the conclusion that there ha[d] been prior discrim- 
ination."'l 
It should be noted that the majority declined "to define in detail the line of demarcation 
between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." Id. at 208. 
69 It has been argued that the Court has applied basically the same standards to Title 
VII and Equal Protection cases. See generally Note, Voluntary Public Employer Affirmative Action: 
Reconciling Title VI I  Consent Decrees with The Equal Protectzon Cla im of Majority Employees, 28 
B.C.L. REV. 1007 (1987). But see Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Auth., 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449 
n.6 (1987) (suggesting that the standards are not identical). 
70 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). 
7 l  Id .  at 1848. Such evidence was found lacking in the record below. Moreover, the layoff 
preference was held to violate the requirement that race-conscious relief must be narrowly 
tailored because the challenged plan required the discharge of senior white teachers, in favor 
of junior black teachers. Id. 
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor read this as not 
requiring that the programs' adoption "be accompanied by contem- 
I poraneous findings of actual discrimination," but simply that "the 
public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is 
required."72 She added that "[tlhe imposition of a requirement that 
I public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal 
discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs 
would severely undermine public employers' incentive to meet vol- 
untarily their civil rights  obligation^."^^ As will be seen, the Court 
came very close to imposing just such a requirement last Term. 
In its 1987 Term, the Court upheld the operation of a gender- 
preference plan unilaterally adopted by a public employer. Johnson 
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, C a l i f ~ r n i a ~ ~  rejected the 
Title VII claim of a white male who was denied a promotion in 
favor of a female ranked immediately below him on the civil service 
eligible list. Diane Joyce got the job pursuant to an affirmative action 
plan that made gender a factor in the selection process. Recognizing 
that "voluntary employer action can play a crucial role in furthering 
Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination in 
the ~orkplace ," '~  the majority rejected the dissent's assertion that 
affirmative action plans may be adopted only upon a showing that 
the employer itself had engaged in past di~crimination.~~ Such a 
standard would thwart voluntary efforts because "the prospect of 
liability created by such an admission would create a significant 
disincentive for voluntary action."77 Rather, the justification neces- 
sary to support affirmative action is the existence of "manifest im- 
balance" reflecting the underrepresentation of the group in ques- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The statistics demonstrating this imbalance would have to be 
finely tuned to the qualified labor market from which the positions 
have been filled, and not simply a comparison to the general pop- 
~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  Because none of the 238 skilled crafts positions at issue in 
Johnson was filled by a female, the Court found sufficient justifica- 
tion for affirmative action. Moreover, the Court concluded that the 
agency's plan was narrowly tailored in that it set flexible goals in- 
72 Id .  at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
73 Id. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
74 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
75 Id. at 145 1. 
76 Id. at 1451 n.8. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1452. 
79 Id. 
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stead of a fixed quota, and gender was only one of several factors 
considered in the promotion decision.80 
Last Term's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.,~' 
while reflecting a continuing consensus in favor of the concept of 
affirmative action, represents so significant a tightening of the jus- 
tification necessary to support it that many potential initiators will 
be discouraged from acting. The City of Richmond, Virginia, had 
adopted a Minority Business Utilization Plan which set aside thirty 
percent of city construction contracts to go to minority-owned firms. 
The adoption of the plan was based not on evidence that the city 
had actually discriminated against minority contractors, but rather 
on the imbalance between a black population of fifty percent and 
minority participation in city contracts of less than ope percent. An 
unsuccessful white bidder challenged the plan as unconstitutional. 
Although disagreeing on the appropriate standard of scrutiny, 
all the Justices except Scalia concluded that under the right circum- 
stances, race-conscious relief was lawful.82 Justices O'Connor, Rehn- 
quist, White, and Kennedy adopted "strict scrutiny" as the appro- 
priate level of review, holding that such plans would have to be 
narrowly designed to remedy the present effects of identzjiable past 
discrimination.g3 
While a ten percent minority set-aside adopted by Congress for 
federal construction projects had previously passed constitutional 
muster,84 the Richmond plan was struck down. The majority held 
that it suffered from the same defects as the lay-off preference in 
Wygant: the City did not have "a strong basis in evidence to support 
its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" to remedy past 
discrimination, and the plan was not "narrowly tailored" to remedy 
prior d iscr iminat i~n.~~ 
so Such an approach has been referred to as the "Harvard Plan." See id. at 1455. 
109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
82 Justice Scalia wrote separately and espoused the absolute colorblind principle: govern- 
ment may not prefer persons of one race over the other, but must merely compensate proven 
victims of discrimination. Id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy indicated his 
agreement with this view, but joined O'Connor in deference to precedent. Id. at 734 (Ken- 
nedy, J., concurring). 
83 Justice Stevens preferred not to engage in the debate over the proper standard of 
review. Id. at 732 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun argued 
- - 
for a more relaxed "important governmental objectives" standard. Id. at 743-45 ( ~ a r i h a l l ,  
J., dissenting). 
84 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Croson Court held that affirmative 
action instituted by state and local governments must be scrutinized more strictly than that 
which is the product of Congressional action. See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 717-20. 
85 The Court concluded-that "none of the evidence presented by the city points to any 
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Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. In discussing 
the factual justification necessary to support a race preference, she 
I rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that a city's minority set-aside 
could be justified only by findings of past discrimination on the part 
of the city itself.86 Rather, a showing that the city had been a "passive 
a participant" in systematic exclusion of minorities by private industry 
would suffice to support the ~ e t - a s i d e . ~ ~  But general comparisons 
of minority population with minority participation would not suf- 
fice; only particularized findings of past discrimination would justify 
a s e t - a ~ i d e . ~ ~  Moreover, the Court seems to suggest that the city 
must identify and define the discrimination prior to the adoption of 
the plan, so that it may narrowly tailor the remedy to the problem.89 
Beyond these concerns, the governmental unit contemplating 
affirmative action must consider (and perhaps attempt) race-neutral 
means to redress the past discrimination such as programs of train- 
ing or financial aid to small bus ines~es .~~  Racial preferences are to 
be reserved for "the extreme case" in which alternatives, including 
"appropriate measures" against known perpetrators of discrimina- 
tion, fail to dismantle the closed system.g1 Further, the goal set for 
minority participation must not amount to "outright racial balanc- 
ing," but must reflect labor market realities.g2 Lastly, programs 
should include provisions for waivers in which a non-preferred 
bidder is given the opportunity to demonstrate that the party claim- 
ing the preference has not suffered the effects of discrimination.g3 
In short, while the Court continues to profess preference for 
voluntary as opposed to court-ordered compliance with civil rights 
laws, it has established an impressive array of obstacles that must 
be negotiated prior to engaging in affirmative action.94 Justice 
identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry." 109 S. Ct. at 727. Moreover, 
Justice O'Connor noted that the definition of minority in the Richmond plan included black, 
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut. Because of the complete absence of 
evidence bf past-discrimination in that community against five of these groups, the scope of 
this definition obviously went beyond the narrow confines of remedying the effects of such 
past treatment. The plan, in short, was deemed "grossly overinclusive." Id. at 728. 
86 Id. at 716-17. 
87 Id. at 720. 
88 Id. at 723-25. 
89 Id .  at 723-30. 
Id.  at 728-30. 
g1 Id. at 729. 
g2 Id. There is a distinct risk that defining the appropriate remedial goal by reference to 
minority participation in the racially closed market will perpetuate underrepresentation. 
93 Id. at 728-29. 
94 Justice Marshall described the decision as "a deliberate and giant step backward in 
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O'Connor rejects the concern that localities will not engage in the 
"bureaucratic effort necessary to tailor remedial relief to those who 
truly have suffered the effects of prior dis~rimination,"~~ but Croson 
will undoubtedly serve as a major disincentive against affirmative 
action.g6 The political as well as financial costs to a locality of doc- 
umenting a case of identifiable past discrimination in an industry 
are not to be underestimated. 
Thus, though the concept of affirmative action seems safe with 
the Court for the indefinite future, its reality clearly is going to be 
a different story. Post-Croson challenges to existing set-asides have 
been filed around the nation, and those programs have not fared 
well under that decision's strict scrutinyeg7 
A decision that may prove equally destructive to the future of 
race-conscious relief is Martin v. W i l k ~ . ~ ~  This case involved a collat- 
eral challenge to a consent decree, entered in a prior Title VII 
action, which established goals for the hiring and promotion of 
minorities in various agencies of Birmingham, Alabama. The Su- 
preme Court had previously recognized the propriety of such mu- 
tually agreeable relief in the context of resolving Title VII litiga- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
this Court's affirmative action jurisprudence," a "grapeshot attack on race-conscious remedies 
in general," and a "full-scale retreat from the Court's longstanding solicitude to race-conscious 
remedial efforts." Id. at 740, 757 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He read the majority as signalling 
"that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past, and that govern- 
ment bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice." Id. at 752. 
95 Id. at 729. 
96 AS the dissenters saw it, the decision "will inevitably discourage or prevent govern- 
mental entities, particularly States and localities, from acting to rectify the scourge of past 
discrimination." Id. at 740 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
97 See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 707 F. Supp 1016 (W.D. Wis. 1989) 
(A state statutory set-aside program designed to increase participation of "socially and eco- 
nomically disadvantaged" businesses in the awarding of highway contracts was preliminarily 
enjoined under Croson. The court concluded that the Croson criteria for evaluating race- 
conscious plans applied to this program because there was a statutory presumption that 
minority Goups are socially disadvantaged and thus within the program'sprefereice), mod- 
zjied on other grounds, 710 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1989); American Subcontractors Ass'n v. 
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 376 S.E.2d 662 (1989). (The City of Atlanta's minority and female 
business enterprise set-aside program was held to violate the Georgia Constitution's equal 
protection clause. Applying the Croson strict scrutiny analysis, the court found "woefully 
inadequaten the evidence offered to demonstrate a "strong basis" for the conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary. The court found studies indicating a general under-utilization 
of minority contractors in the nation and the state insufficient to support the city's program. 
The court further concluded that the plan was not "narrowly tailored" because it was not 
linked to identifiable past discrimination and the city had failed to explore less drastic 
alternative remedies). 
g8 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). 
9g See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986), 
in which the Court rejected a challenge to a consent decree that provided race-conscious 
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Martin began with a 1974 case brought by the NAACP, chal- 
lenging the City of Birmingham's hiring and promotion practices. 
w A trial was held in 1976, and the district judge found that the 
defendants' test used to screen entry-level applicants was racially 
biased. A second trial was then held, focusing on promotion prac- 
L tices. Before the decision was rendered, however, the parties ne- 
gotiated two consent decrees providing long- and short-term goals 
for minority hiring and promotion in various agencies, including 
the fire department. Notice of these proposed decrees was pub- 
lished in local newspapers, and a hearing was held prior to final 
approval. The Firefighters Association appeared at the hearing and 
filed objections to the decrees as amicus curiae. Other objections 
came from certain black firefighters, who attacked the decrees as 
inadequate, and individual white firefighters, who opposed the race 
preferences. loo 
After the hearing, the Firefighters Association sought to inter- 
vene to oppose the proposed decrees, but the district court denied 
intervention as untimely.lO' The district court overruled the objec- 
tions that had been raised and approved the decrees, finding strong 
indication in the record that the City would ultimately be found 
liable for the alleged discrimination, and that the remedy provided 
in the decrees was flexible and narrowly tailored within the param- 
eters of Weber, et al. In addition, the court responded to the specific 
i objections that had been raised to the entry of the decrees. In short, there was a "genuine adversary proceeding" and a full airing of the 
issues surrounding the propriety of the relief ordered.lo2 
remedies benefitting persons who were not actual victims of discrimination. The decree had 
been entered in a Title VII action over the objections of the intervenor union. 
Compare Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), in which the Court 
overturned a district court order providing for a minority preference against layoff in the 
Memphis Fire Department. The court had issued the order, which suspended the last-in/ 
first-out seniority system, to protect the gains in minority employment that had resulted from 
earlier affirmative action consent decrees providing for preferential hiring. The Stotts Court 
held that such interference with the operation of a bona fide seniority system could not be 
justified except to compensate actual victims of past discrimination. Id. at 583. 
w The Reagan Justice Department, under Ed Meese, seized upon the Stotts decision as the 
deathknell of race-conscious relief and so notified state and local governments around the 
nation. The Court subsequently explicitly rejected so broad a reading of Stotts. See Local 28, 
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3048-50 (1986). 
c. loo 109 S. Ct. at 2183, 2191. 
lo' The Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed the order denying leave to intervene, 
together with the dismissal of an earlier collateral suit brought by seven white firefighters 
challenging the operation of the consent decrees. See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183; United States 
v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 151 1 (1 lth Cir. 1983). 
Io2 See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Some two years after the consent decrees were entered, Wilks 
and several other white Birmingham firefighters filed a Title VII 
action against the city, alleging that they were denied promotion 
because of their race. The defendants admitted that they were 
making race-conscious decisions, pursuant to the consent decrees, 
and thus moved to dismiss the reverse discrimination case as an 
impermissible collateral attack on those decrees. 
The courts had widely recognized and applied the "impermis- 
sible collateral attack" doctrine as necessary to protect the integrity 
and finality of judicial decrees.lo3 Under it, persons who might be 
adversely affected by the relief sought in a litigation, and who are 
aware of such litigation, must seek to intervene in those proceedings 
in order to have their input. If they decide to pass up the oppor- 
tunity to intervene, then they will not be permitted to challenge the 
relief issued in a subsequent new proceeding. 
The WiMs plaintiffs had been aware of the prior discrimination 
case, and of the proposed consent decrees, but had not sought to 
intervene or interpose objections to the decrees; therefore, the dis- 
trict court dismissed their action. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded for a trial on the merits. The court explicitly parted 
company with the other circuits on the question of collateral attack, 
holding that the "strong public policy in favor of voluntary affir- 
mative action plans" had to "yield to the policy against requiring 
third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were 
either ignored or sacrificed." lo4 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, 
agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit that the white firefighters were 
entitled to challenge the prior consent decrees in a separate pro- 
ceeding. In a sweeping opinion premised on the "principle of gen- 
eral application in anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not 
bound by a judgment in personam in litigation in which he is not 
designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by 
service of process," the Court rejected the impermissible collateral 
lo3 AS the Court in Martin noted, the doctrine "commanded the approval of the great 
majority of federal courts of appeals." Id. at 2185 (& cases collected at 2185 n.3). See also 2 
A. LARSON, supra note 32, 8 56.24, at 11-84.9 (and cases cited). The doctrine served to 
"immunize parties to a consent decree from charges of discrimination by nonparties for 
actions taken pursuant to the decree." 109 S. Ct. at 2184. Collateral attack on certain narrow 
grounds, such as lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or collusion in the entry of the 
decree, was permitted. Id. at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
lo4 I n  re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 
(11th Cir. 1987). 
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attack doctrine.lo5 The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist holds 
that the burden of intervention cannot any longer be placed on the 
person whose interest may be adversely affected by the relief re- 
quested in the litigation. Rather, the burden is now on the civil 
rights plaintiffs to join such parties under FRCP 19. The Court 
wrote: 
The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than 
anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the 
action, and at whose expense such relief might be granted. 
It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of 
bringing in additional parties where such a step is indi- 
cated, rather than placing on potential additional parties 
a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the 
lawsuit. The linchpin of the "impermissible collateral at- 
tack" doctrine - the attribution of preclusive effect to a 
failure to intervene - is therefore quite inconsistent with 
Rule 19 and Rule 24.1°6 
The Martin Court conceded that there are "difficulties" in- 
volved in "identifying those who could be adversely affected by a 
lo5 109 S. Ct. at 2184 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 31 1 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). While the four 
dissenters conceded this principle, they contended that a decree may nevertheless permissibly 
affect nonparties: 
There is no reason, however, why the consent decrees might not produce 
changes in conditions at the white firefighters' place of employment that, as a 
practical matter, may have a serious effect on their opportunities for employ- 
ment or promotion even though they are not bound by the decrees in any legal 
sense. The fact that one of the effects of a decree is to curtail the job oppor- 
tunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties have been deprived 
of legal rights or that they have standing to appeal from the decree without 
becoming parties. 
Id. at 2189 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Io6 Id. at 2186. It should be noted that the drafters of FRCP 19 explicitly contemplated 
intervention of the absent party as an alternative to mandatory joinder: "[Tlhe absentee may 
sometimes be able to avert prejudice to himself by voluntarily appearing in the action or 
intervening . . . ." FED. R. CIV. P. 19 Advisory Committee's Note to 1966 Amendment. 
Indeed, the drafters noted that "[iln some situations it may be desirable to advise a person 
who has not been joined of the fact that the action is pending, and in particular cases the 
court in its discretion may itself convey this information by directing a letter or other informal 
notice to the absentee." Id. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that the proper route in civil rights cases is mandatory 
joinder, and not voluntary intervention, had been previously expressed by him as a minority 
view. See Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties JATC v. Eldredge, 459 U.S. 917, 921- 
22 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("It is respondents who have 
sought to affect the hiring practices of some 4500 employers; it is respondents, and not the 
absent employers, who should shoulder the responsibility of joining the necessarily affected 
employers or suffering dismissal of their lawsuits"). 
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decree granting broad remedial relief" and joining them in the 
suit.lo7 Yet, in the Court's eyes the problem results from the broad 
equitable relief plaintiffs request in civil rights cases, and thus these 
plaintiffs should suffer the consequences.10s 
It .would be difficult to conjure up a more begrudging indul- 
gence of the right of minorities and women to seek remedies for 
discriminatory conduct. It would be equally difficult to imagine a 
more chilling precedent for prospective plaintiffs and their counsel 
who, if they contemplate federal litigation to enforce their rights to 
equal opportunity, must now confront the arduous task of identi- 
fying and joining any and all parties whom the desired relief might 
at some point impact.log It would be harder still to devise a scenario 
more likely to discourage defendants from entering into consent 
decrees than this one, in which an unjoined person lurking in the 
wings may at any point emerge with a lawsuit in which liability is 
predicated upon compliance with the original consent judgment. 11° 
Martin v. Wilh opens all existing consent decrees to collateral 
attack and presumably relitigation of the underlying issues.ll1 If the 
lo' 109 S. Ct. at 2187. 
los The problems "arise from the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 2187. 
log It must be remembered that the failure to join indispensible parties is grounds for 
dismissal of the federal action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); Eldredge, 459 U.S. at 923 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). But "the possibility of an adverse effect on non parties, even when it is entitled 
to consideration, should not automatically result in dismissal of the action if they are not 
joined." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 10.12, at 535 (3d ed. 1985) (& citations). 
Failure to join an indispensible party is not a jurisdictional defect depriving the court of 
power to act. Id. at 544. 
l l o  This is particularly troublesome because as one treatise puts it, 
Settlements are generally favored in the law for reasons of judicial economy 
and because it is expected that the parties will generally be more satisfied by a 
process of self-imposed compromise and agreement than by court-imposed 
adjudication, particularly in light of the savings in time and expense for the 
litigants. 
In employment discrimination cases, settlements are especially favored. 
Such cases are often so protracted - involving multiple appeals, intervening 
changes in the decisional law, a decade or more of unresolved conflict, and 
massive legal fees - that they rival antitrust litigation. The savings in time and 
expense to both the court and the litigants is therefore more valuable in em- 
ployment discrimination cases . . . . 
2 A. LARSON, supra note 32, 5 56.10, at 11-81 (citations omitted). 
This is an interes~ing result for Chief Justice Rehnquist to reach, given his adamant 
commitment to the doctrines of finality in other contexts. In Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, rejected the view 
of the Ninth Circuit that there should be a "public policy" exception to the doctrine of res 
judicata. The exception would have permitted non-appealing plaintiff consumers to benefit 
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Court's decision is what it appears to be, namely a call for what in 
an earlier era of the civil rights struggle would be termed "massive 
resistence" to the civil rights decrees of federal courts,ll* then the 
march to undo court-approved affirmative action around the nation 
is underway.l13 It is apparent that court clerks are going to be 
dusting off a lot of dead case files in the coming years. 
Moreover, the Court's rejection of the impermissible collateral 
attack doctrine would seem to apply equally well to relief ordered 
by a judge after full trial and without the consent of the parties.l14 
from a reversal of a judgment based on precedent that the Supreme Court had since 
overruled. Rehnquist wrote that 
"A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law 
is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review and 
not by bringing another action upon the same cause [of action]." We have 
observed that "[tlhe indulgence of a contrary view would result in creating 
elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the conclusive character of 
judgments, consequences which it was the very purpose of the doctrine of res 
judicata to avert." 
. . . .  
"Simple justice" is achieved when a complex body of law developed over a 
period of years is even-handedly applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves 
iital public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of the 
equities in a particular case. There is simply "no principle of law or equity which 
sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judi- 
cata." 
Id. at 398-99, 401. (citations omitted; emphasis added). The Chief Justice had previously 
weighed in against approaches that "tend to reduce the district courts to issuers of 'paper 
decrees which neither adjudicate nor, in the end, protect rights.' This is hardly a sound way 
to expend the energies of overburdened districtjudges." Eldredge, 459 U.S. at 922 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), in which the Court excluded 
from federal habeas corpus review claims that the peti~ioner's conviction resulted from the 
introduction of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The Court, per Justice 
Powell (with Rehnquist participating), explained that such collateral review and relitigation 
undermined "the necessity of finality in criminal trials." 428 U.S. at 465 n.31. 
l L 2  See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 948-52 (1975); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND 
AMERICAN LAW 381-87 (2d ed. 1980). 
Justice Scalia was overt in his encouragement to potential intervenors who seek to 
challenge proposed affirmative action consent decrees: "an intervenor of the sort before us 
- .  . 
here is particularly welcome since we have stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII 
litigation, 'the legitimate expectations of employees . . . innocent of any wrongdoing."' 
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2737-38 (1989) 
(citation omitted). 
1 1 3  See, e,g., Boston Globe, June 13, 1989 at 6, col. 6; at 17, col. 1. Both articles describe 
the plans tochallenge affirmative action decrees in force in the Boston police and fire 
department since the 1970's. 
l l 4  As Justice Stevens observed, 
Any remedy that seeks to create employment conditions that would have ob- 
tained if there had been no violations of law will necessarily have an adverse 
impact on whites, who musL now share their job and promotion opportunities 
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Thus, under the regime envisioned by Martin, a judgment entered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction and final at the completion of 
the appellate review process may be reopened by another court. 
There is "no end to litigation and no fixed established rights"; a 
"judgment, though unreversed and irreversible, would no longer 
be a final adjudication of the rights of the litigants, but the starting 
point from which a new litigation would spring up."l15 And the 
Court has failed to indicate any time limit on the right to pursue 
collateral attack. 
This apparent lack of concern regarding time limitations and 
repose contrasts sharply with the Court's disposition of another civil 
rights case decided the same day as Martin v. Wilks. In Lorance v. 
ATUT Technologies, l n ~ . , " ~  three black women had filed a Title VII 
action challenging the modification of AT8cT's seniority system in 
a way that ultimately caused them to be demoted from their posi- 
tions. The plaintiffs asserted that the modifications, which had oc- 
curred in 1979 but were not applied to them until 1982, had been 
designed to protect certain positions for incumbent white males. 
Concluding that the limitations period should run from the point 
at which the seniority system was altered, and not the point at which 
such changes actually impacted the plaintiffs, the Court held that 
the complaints must be dismissed as untimely. The Court reached 
this result despite the fact that "[oln the day AT8cT's seniority 
system was adopted, there was no reason to believe that a woman 
who exercised her plantwide seniority to become a tester would ever 
be demoted as a result of the new ~ystem.""~ Justice Scalia explained 
for the majority that "allowing a facially neutral system to be chal- 
lenged, and entitlements under it to be altered, many years after 
with blacks. Just as white employees in the past were innocent beneficiaries of 
illegal discriminatory practices, so is it inevitable that some of the same white 
employees will be innocent victims who must share some of the burdens result- 
ing from the redress of past wrongs. 
109 S. Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 2196 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
1 1 6  109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989). 
'I7 Id. at 2270 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court's limitations ruling applies "even if 
the employee who subsequently challenges that system could not reasonably have expected 
to be demoted or otherwise concretely harmed by the new system at the time of its adoption, 
and, indeed, even if the employee was not working in the affected division of the company 
at the time of the system's adoption." Id. 
Lorance also continues the special treatment afforded seniority systems under Title VII,  
immunizing them from attack on anything other than a showing of actual discriminatory 
intent. See id. at 2265, 2267. See generally Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive i n  Defining 
Discrimination: The  Seniority Question Under Title V I I ,  62 N.C.L. REV. 943 (1984). 
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its adoption would disrupt those valid reliance interests that 8 703(h) 
[the seniority proviso of Title VII] was meant to p r~ tec t . " "~  
3 Thus, on the same day, the Court issued one decision allowing 
white males, who were aware of but had declined to join a federal 
action seeking to restructure personnel practices in their depart- 
< ment, to pursue a subsequent collateral attack on the prior judg- 
ment; and another decision dismissing an action by black females 
because they were obligated "to anticipate, and initiate suit to pre- 
vent, future adverse applications of a seniority system, no matter 
how speculative or unlikely these applications may be."llg The Lor- 
ance result was justified as necessary to avoid disrupting the reliance 
of white males on an allegedly discriminatory seniority system; yet, 
the Court exhibited no such concern in Martin v. Wi1k.s for the 
reliance interests surrounding the final remedial decree of a federal 
district court. 
V. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
The focus of much of the public and legal profession's attention 
during the 1988 Term was on the landmark post-Civil War enact- 
ment now codified at 42 U.S.C section 1981. The statute provides 
black citizens with "the same right to make and enforce contracts 
as is enjoyed by white citizens." 
After allowing it to lie dormant for 100 years, the Supreme 
I Court revived section 198 1 in the mid- 1970s as a remedy for private 
1 (as well as public) sector race discrimination that supplemented (and 
was not supplanted by) Title VII.120 The statute quickly became a 
popular vehicle for challenging discrimination, as it affords several 
1 notable advantages over Title VII. It is not limited to employers of 
1 fifteen or more employees, as is Title VII. It is not confined by the 
I 
I short statutory limitations period, nor the administrative exhaustion 
I 
I requirements, of the 1964 act. Unlike Title VII actions, jury trials 
I are available in section 1981 claims. And, perhaps most important, 
I while Title VII monetary damages are limited to lost wages and 
benefits (and those only for a period of two years prior to the filing 
I of the administrative complaint), prevailing plaintiffs in section 
1 T 198 1 cases can recover tort damages - compensatory damages for 
I 
l L 8  Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2269. 
< I L g  Id at 2273 (Marshall, J., d~ssenting). 
'20 See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 32, § 88.00, at 18-1 to 18-22 (1989); M. PLAYER, EMPLOY- 
1 MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 61 1-19 (1988); M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES 
I & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 894-95 (2d ed. 1988). 
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emotional distress and humiliation, and, in appropriate cases, pu- 
nitive damages as we11.121 This latter distinction becomes most im- 
portant in those cases in which the plaintiff is allegedly subjected 
to unlawful harassment but can point to no tangible lost pay or 
fringe benefit for which monetary relief is available under Title 
VII. 
During the 1987 Term, five of the Justices, acting on their own 
initiative and without any request from the parties to the lawsuit, 
decided to use the case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union as a 
vehicle to reconsider those decisions that had given Reconstruction 
Era statutes like section 1981 new life. Waves of anxiety were sent 
through the civil rights community. 
Brenda Patterson had filed her action claiming that as a teller 
employed by the defendant credit union for ten years, she had been 
subjected to systematic harassment and mistreatment - including 
the refusal to promote her or give her routine wage increases, and 
her ultimate discharge from employment - based on the fact that 
she was black. The district court determined that a claim for racial 
harassment was not actionable under section 1981, and thus de- 
clined to submit that part of the case to the jury at trial. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and affirmed. 
After hearing oral argument on this point, the Supreme Court 
ordered the parties to file briefs addressed to the question of 
whether section 198 1 prohibited discrimination in the private sector, 
and the case was set down for r e a r g ~ m e n t . ~ ~ ~  
The Court issued its long-awaited decision in Patterson on June 
15, 1989, deciding not to overrule its prior decisions holding that 
section 198 1 prohibits racial discrimination in the making of private 
employment contracts.123 But as Justice Brennan observed, "[wlhat 
the Court declines to snatch away with one hand it takes away with 
the other."lZ4 The five-Justice majority held that section 1981 applies 
only to the formation of the employment contract itself, and not to 
conduct that occurs after the parties enter into the contract. Thus 
section 198 1 is not to be interpreted as a general prohibition against 
discrimination in employment, but merely a protection of the op- 
portunity to enter into an employment contract on non-racial terms. 
Breach of the terms of that contract, as well as the imposition of 
12' See generally A. LARSON, supra note 32, § 88.00, at 18-23 to 18-56. 
lZ2 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369. 
lZ3 Id. at 2369-71. 
lZ4 Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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discriminatory working conditions once employment has begun, are 
no longer actionable under section 198 1 .Iz5 Rather, plaintiffs must 
pursue such claims under the more restrictive provisions of Title 
vII.126 
While the nature of section 1981's prohibition was thus sub- 
stantially narrowed by Patterson, the scope of municipal liability in 
public sector cases under the statute was also curtailed during the 
1988 Term. In Jett v. Dallas Independent School District,127 a white man 
employed by the Dallas school system as a teacher and head football 
coach at a predominantly black high school brought a section 1981 
action alleging racial discrimination. Jett asserted that the recom- 
mendation of the school principal, a black man, that he be removed 
from his coaching position, as well as his subsequent transfer by the 
superintendent to another school where he had no coaching re- 
sponsibilities, were racially motivated. The jury found for the plain- 
tiff and awarded him $650,000 against the school district, $150,000 
against the principal and school district jointly and severally, and 
$50,000 in punitive damages against the principal in his individual 
capacity. lZs 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re- 
versed in part and remanded, holding that municipal liability under 
section 1981 must be limited in the same manner that the Court 
had previously held it to be under section 1983;129 that is, a locality 
is liable for the conduct of its official only if that official either has 
been delegated policymaking authority, or acted pursuant to a well 
settled custom amounting to official policy. This decision placed the 
Fifth Circuit at odds with the other circuits that had ruled on this 
I z 5  With regard to Patterson's claim that she had been discriminatorily denied promotion, 
the Court suggested that if it could be shown that the change in position would have 
constituted a new contract with the employer, then the claims would be actionable under 
section 198 1. 
lZ6 AS noted above, that means that victims of racial harassment will be unable to obtain 
monetary compensation for their emotional distress. The only remedy Title VII affords for 
such harassment is prospective injunctive relief. Seegenerally A. LARSON, supra note 32, 5 88.00, 
at 18-23 to 18-56. 
Four members of the Court would have held that a plaintiff states a valid claim under 
§ 1981 if "the acts constituting the harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive as 
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutial manner." 
109 S. Ct. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
l Z 7  109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989). 
lZ8 Defendants did not raise the issue of whether section 1981 covered this type of post- 
contract conduct, and thus the Court noted but declined to rule on the Patterson question 
here. Id. at 2709-10. 
lZ9 See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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question and had concluded that local governments are liable under 
a theory of respondeat superior for their employees' violations of 
section 1981 .130 
On certiorari, a divided Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth 
Municipal liability can no longer be predicated on respon- 
deat superior in an action under section 1981.13* It will be the plain- 
tiff's burden in actions against governmental entities to establish 
not only the substantive claim of intentional discrimination, but also 
that the official engaging in the discrimination was either invested 
with policymaking authority by the locality (so that the official's 
conduct can be said to represent municipal or acted pur- 
suant to a longstanding practice or custom of the local government. 
Section 1981 thus emerges from the 1988 Supreme Court Term 
like a patient who is ordered to undergo surgery, being advised that 
she probably will not survive the procedure. To her delight, she 
awakens alive in the recovery room, but then finds that all her limbs 
have been amputated. As a remedy against discrimination in both 
I3O See cases cited at 109 S:Ct. at 2709. 
I3l  The dissenters wrote that 
To anyone familiar with this and last Terms debate over whether [Runyon] 
should be overruled, see [Patterson], today's decision can be nothing short of 
astonishing. After being led to believe that the hard question under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 . . . was whether the statute created a cause of action relating to przuate 
conduct, today we are told that the hard question is, in fact, whether it creates 
such an action on the basis of governmental conduct. Strange indeed, simulta- 
neously to question whether § 1981 creates a cause of action on the basis of 
private conduct (Patterson) and whether it creates one for governmental conduct 
(this case)-hence to raise the possibility that this landmark civil-rights statute 
affords no civil redress at all. 
Id.  at 2724 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
132 See zd. at 2723. The Court ruled that section 1983 afforded the only available cause 
of action against governmental discrimination, and that section 1981 actions must be brought 
through the vehicle of a section 1983 action. 
'33 The Court instructed that this is a question of state law, to be resolved by the judge 
~ - 
before the case is submitted to the jury. Id .  
In another governmental liability decision of significance for future civil rights litigation, 
the Court held that neither states nor state officials (acting in their official capacity) are 
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 
2304, 2312 (1989). Will was a state trooper who sued in state court claiming he had been 
denied a promotion because of his brother's political activities. He named as defendants the 
Department and the Director of State Police in his official capacity. Resolving a conflict in 
the decisional law on this point, the Court held that neither defendant was subject to a 
damage action under § 1983. Id .  at 2311. Thus, litigants who seek a remedy against a state 
for the deprivation of civil liberties can no longer use that statute. The Court added the 
caveat that actions seeking injunctive relief, and not damages, may proceed against state 
officials in their official capacity. 
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public and private employment, 42 U.S.C. section 1981 is not the 
statute it used to be. 
1 
VI. CONCLUSION 
.i. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Patterson, concluded: 
[Tlhe law now reflects society's consensus that dis- 
crimination based on the color of one's skin is a profound 
wrong of tragic dimension. Neither our words nor our 
decisions should be interpreted as signaling one inch of 
retreat from Congress' policy to forbid discrimination in 
the private, as well as public, sphere.134 
There is considerable cause for scepticism regarding this noble 
pronouncement. The 1988 Term's decisions have made it signifi- 
cantly harder to establish liability under Title VII, and significantly 
easier to defend against such actions. Impact theory, which had 
proved an invaluable tool in bringing excluded groups into the 
workplace, has clearly lost its cutting edge. The scope of section 
1981's prohibition, as well as its applicability to governmental con- 
duct, have been substantially narrowed. Those governmental enti- 
ties inclined to engage in voluntary affirmative efforts to increase 
opportunities for minorities now must exhaust race-neutral alter- 
natives, document a record of specific discrimination, and narrowly 
confine their efforts to undoing the present effects of that discrim- 
1 ination. Perhaps most important, abandonment of the inipermissi- 
I ble collateral attack doctrine has dramatically undercut the integrity I 
I and enforcibility of federal remedial decrees. 
1 
The structure for enforcement of civil rights legislation that 
I has been dismantled during the 1988 Term was not the product of 
the "liberal7' and controversial Warren Court, but rather of the 
I "conservative" Burger Court. By the 1985 Term, that Court already consisted of seven justices appointed by Republican presidents;135 
yet, Griggs's disparate impact theory, a broad interpretation of sec- 
I 
tion 198 1, and affirmative race-conscious relief were all intact. The 
I established doctrine uprooted last Term had been, in short, planted 
and nurtured by a majority of Justices not known for their pro- 
i % gressive leanings. They joined, however, in recognizing the com- 
I 
s 
134 109 S. Ct. at 2379. 
135 Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist were appointed by President Nixon; Stevens 
by President Ford; O'Connor by President Reagan; and Brennan by President Eisenhower. 
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pelling necessity for finally resolving what Gunnar Myrdal long ago 
identified as the most persistent of American tragedies: racism.136 
The post-Civil War period witnessed the federal government's 
effort to protect the newly freed slaves and integrate them into 
American society. This first Reconstruction was, however, aban- 
doned after 10 years, and blacks were subjected to brutal and op- 
pressive treatment at the hands of state and local authorities as well 
as terrorist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.137 Another Reconstruc- 
tion occurred in the mid-1960s, with the enactment and revival of 
federal legislation designed to assure minorities and women equal 
opportunity and a place in the American economic mainstream. 
Unfortunately, last Term's decisions spell a judicial abandonment 
of that second Reconstruction. This comes at a time when the 
economic gap between white and non-white Americans is widen- 
ing. 138 
Once again the fate of the Nation's disadvantaged has been cast 
to the winds. 
1 3 ~  See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). 
13' See generally D. BELL. supra note 112, at 30-38 (& citations therein); E. FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988). 
138 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, reported in Boston Globe, Jan. 29, 
1989, at A19. Black per capita income, as a percentage of white income, is declining. Black 
poverty is up, while white poverty is down. Black unemployment remains twice that of white. 
